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TRADE REGULATION-PRICE DISCRIMINATIONLiability for "Fourth Level" Injury Falls Within
the Scope of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,
as Amended by the Robinson-Patman ActPerkins v. Standard Oil Company
of Cal.ifornia*
During the mid-1950's Clyde A. Perkins, a major independent
wholesaler and retailer operating in the states of Washington and
Oregon, bought substantial quantities of gasoline and oil from Standard Oil Company of California. During the same period, Standard
also sold gasoline and oil to Signal Oil and Gas Company, a large
wholesaler whose subsidiaries operated at wholesale and retail levels
in the same area as Perkins.1 The price Standard charged to Signal,

• 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
1. In addition, Standard sold directly to its Branded Dealers, which are retailers
that, in effect, comprise Standard's retail division.
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however, was lower than the price it charged to Perkins.2 Signal
passed on the advantages of this lower price to its subsidiary, Western
Hyway, which in tum sold at a reduced price to one of its own subsidiaries, Regal Stations Company. The competitive effect of this
price differential was that the retail stations operated by Regal were
able to undercut Perkins' retail price. Perkins' consequent inability
to compete resulted in a decline in sales and induced him to sell his
business at a low price. He then sued Standard Oil for treble damages
under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the RobinsonPatman Price Discrimination Act,3 alleging that the financial injuries
he suffered while competing with Regal at the retail level were a
result of Standai:d's price discrimination at the wholesale level. 4
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
entered judgment in favor of Perkins; 5 but the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the injury incurred by
Perkins as a result of Regal's low retail prices occurred too far down
the distribution chain for Standard to be liable under section 2(a). 6
The court of appeals noted that the coverage of the Robinson-Patman Act is restricted to injuries caused by an impairment of competition with (1) the seller ("any person who ... grants ... such
discrimination"), (2) the favored purchaser ("any person who
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination"), or (3)
customers of the discriminating seller or favored purchaser ("customers of either of them"). 7 Regal clearly did not fall within the
first two categories, since it obviously was not the "seller" or the
2. The Branded Dealers were also charged a lower price than was Perkins.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of ~uch
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination or with customers of either of them • • • .
4. In two additional causes of action, Perkins claimed that his losse5 due to
Standard's discrimination stemmed from his inability to compete (1) at the wholc ale
level because of Standard's lower price to Signal, and (2) at the retail level becau~e
of Standard's lower price to its Branded Dealers.
5. The district court found Standard liable on all three counts. The district court's
opinion is unreported.
6. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1968). The
court of appeals, however, concurred with the trial court's finding that Standard
was clearly liable under the two additional causes of action, for the injury caused by
its discrimination at the wholesale level in favor of Signal, and for that caused by its
discrimination at the retail level in favor of its Branded Dealers. See note 4 supra.
7. These quotations are from the Clayton Act § 2(a), as amended, Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). See note 3 supra.
0
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"favored purchaser." Moreover, the court of appeals reasoned, in
terms of the distribution chain, Regal was too far removed from
Standard or Signal to be considered a "customer of either of them."
The Supreme Court, however, speaking through Justice Black, disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation and held that this
"fourth level" competitive injury fell within the scope of section
2(a). 8 Under the Court's expansive reading of the statute, Regal
qualified as being a "customer" of a person who knowingly received
the benefit of price discrimination. 9
In order to analyze the degree to which the Court has extended
the protection of the Robinson-Patman Act in Perkins, one must
examine the decision in light of the polestar case in this area-FTC v.
Fred Meyer, lncorporated. 10 In Meyer a retail supermarket chain
(Meyer) induced suppliers to make contributions of money and goods
to the supermarket's annual coupon book promotion. Such payments
were not made, however, either to retailers in competition with the
supermarket chain or to the wholesalers who supplied them.11 The
Federal Trade Commission sought to enjoin the suppliers from participating in this coupon book campaign, alleging that participation
was a violation of section 2(d) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.12
In general, section 2(d) mandates that the supplier of goods must
make promotional allowances available on comparable terms to all
customers competing in the distribution of such products. Prior to
Meyer the Supreme Court had never extended the protection of
section 2(d) to include third-line injury.13 In Meyer, however, the
8. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642, 646-49 (1969).
9. In addition, the Supreme Court concurred with the Ninth Circuit's findings
regarding Standard's liability on the other two counts. See note 6 supra.
IO. 390 U.S. 341 (1968). For an extended discussion of the Meyer decision, see
The FTC and Promotional Allowances: The Fred ,\feyer Quagmire, 55 VA. L. REv.
718 (1969).
11. 390 U.S. at 345.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for anl person engaged in commerce to pay or contract
for the payment of anything o value to or for the benefit of a customer of such
person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with
the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities
manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionately equal terms to all other customers
competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
13. Earl Kintner defines third-line competitive injury as that injury which "is
suffered by the customers of the supplier•s buyer three steps down the distribution
chain." AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 67 (1964). In the context of § 2(d), this definition -means
that if the supplier sells to a wholesaler who in turn sells to retailers, then those who
purchased from that wholesaler must be provided with promotional allowances comparable to those granted to a retailer who bought directly from the supplier and who
competes for sales with the purchasers in question. Following Kintner's reasoning,
fourth-line competitive injury is that injury which occurs four steps down the dis-
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Court held that the supplier had the burden of ensuring that promotional allowances were available on comparable terms to all
dealers which were competing for sales at the retail level, regardless
of whether the retailers bought directly from the supplier or through
a wholesaler. 14 According to the Court, failure to comply with this
mandate resulted in liability when there was injury to competition
at the third functional level. Thus, if one assumes, as do most
writers,15 that Meyer provided the key theoretical jump necessary
to extend the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act past the second level
of competitive injury,16 then it becomes obvious that Perkins is
merely an extension of protection to the next distributional level.
It is clear that the majority of the Court in Perkins felt that its
decision was merely an extension of the philosophy that it had expressed in Meyer. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Black noted
the similarities between the type of action involved in Perkins and
that in Afeyer; and he stated that "to read 'customer' more narrowly
in this section than we did in the section involved in Meyer would
tribution chain. In the Perkins context, it means that when Standard charged a
discriminatory price as between Signal and Perkins, there was an injury to those retailers who bought from Perkins and who competed at the retail level with Regal, a
purchaser from ·western Hyway who, in turn, had bought from the favored Signal.
The retail customers of Perkins were injured because when Regal received the benefit
of the price discrimination which was passed down to it by Signal and Western, it
was at a competitive advantage, and consequently other retailers were unable to
compete effectively. Thus, Perkins, as a retailer, had a treble-damage action against
Standard for an injury which manifested itself four steps down the distribution ladder.
14. 390 U.S. at 358.
15. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 95, 266-71 (1968);
The FTC and Promotional Allowances: The Fred Meyer Quagmire, 55 VA. L. REv.
'718 (1969); cf. E. KINTNER, AN ANTRITRUST PRIMER 68 (1964). But see F. ROWE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r 205 (1962). For extended discussion,
see note 16 infra.
16. This may be a questionable assumption in light of the decision in Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). In that case, Standard of Indiana sold gasoline to large
wholesalers at a price 1½¢ per gallon less than that which it charged to comparatively
smaller service stations in the same geographical area. Some, but not all, of the
wholesalers passed on these savings to retailers to whom they sold. Third-line injury,
then, was clearly at issue. In its decision, the Supreme Court implied that it was
deciding the case on the assumption that there was price discrimination (340 U.S.
at 236), and it then held that Standard had the right under § 2(b) of the Clayton
Act to establish a "meeting the competition" defense. Standard proved that defense,
and the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in FTC v. Standard Oil Co., !155 U.S.
396 (1958). One possible interpretation of the Court's implied assumption in its earlier
decision is that there would have been liability for third-line injury but for the fact
that the discrimination was justified in terms of meeting the competition. See E.
KINTNER, supra note 15, at 68. Rowe, however, disagrees, arguing that because the
Solicitor General repudiated the order of the Federal Trade Commission which
established third-line liability, the government clearly was not prosecuting a third-lineinjury suit. See F. ROWE, supra note 15, at 205. But this position makes little sense
in light of the fact that the repudiation came in oral argument in the 1958 case and
had no effect on the assumption made by the Court in 1951 when the case was
decided. Id. at 200.
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allow price discriminators to avoid the sanctions of the Act by the
simple expedient of adding an additional link in the distribution
chain." 17
Furthermore, there is a considerable amount of language in the
M.eyer decision which can be interpreted as laying the foundation for
the Perkins extension. For example, although the Meyer Court was
dealing with a section 2(d) case, it noted that Congress, when it
drafted section 2(a), intended a very broad meaning for the word
"competition" under that section, a meaning perhaps broader than
that intended under section 2(d).18 This dictum in a section 2(d)
case made it easier for the Court, at a later date, to construe section
2(a) liberally enough to protect against the fourth-level injury in
Perkins. Another way in which Meyer set the groundwork for the
Perkins decision was the Meyer Court's agreement with an FTC
finding that the extra value given to Meyer in the form of promotional expenses not only constituted a violation of section 2(d), but
also amounted to price discrimination which was prohibited by
section 2(a).19 By equating the two sections in this manner, and then
by extending section 2(d) to include third-line injury, the Meyer
Court both implicitly expanded section 2(a) to include the third
functional line and also shortened the step from section 2(d) to
section 2(a).
One should not conclude pre-emptorily, however, that Perkins
is anything more than a limited extension of the Meyer doctrine.
Because the third and fourth distributional levels in Perkins were
occupied by partially 01vned subsidiaries of the second-level corporation which had received the direct benefit of the price discrimination, it is possible that the case will be limited to its facts. Justice
Black hinted at such a limitation in his majority opinion when,
after pointing out that Signal mvned sixty per cent of the stock
of Western Hyway, and that Western Hyway in turn mvned fifty-five
per cent of the stock of Regal Stations Company, he asserted that
there was "no basis in the language or purpose of the Act for immunizing Standard's price discrimination simply because the product
passed through an additional formal exchange before reaching the
level of Perkins' actual competitor.''20 Justice Black's emphasis on
the degree of ownership in the various subsidiaries, and his curious
reference to a "formal" exchange, may indicate a willingness to
limit the decision to situations involving wholly or partially owned
subsidiaries. Justice Marshall underscored this possibility in his
dis.5ent, when he urged the majority to clarify this point so as not
17.
18.
19.
20.

!195
!190
!!90
!195

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at
at
at
at

647.
356-57.
345.
648 (emphasis added).
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to imply by indirection that the same principles would apply if
wholly independent firms intervened in the distributional chain.21
On the other hand, there are several factors which militate
against the conclusion that Perkins will be limited to situations
involving subsidiaries. The Court did not specifically so limit its
decision; and thus, since it was undoubtedly aware that such an alternative existed, the Court did imply "by indirection" that it intended
no such limitation. Furthermore, the Court failed to implement
the indirect-purchaser doctrine, which provides that if a manufacturer deals with a retailer through the intermediary of a wholesaler,
dealer, or jobber, the retailer may nevertheless be considered a
"customer" or "purchaser" of the manufacturer so long as the latter
deals directly with the retailer and controls the terms on which
it buys.22 Although the Court in Meyer had explicitly rejected the
necessity of resorting to the indirect-purchaser doctrine as a means
of extending the protection of the Robinson-Patman Act,23 it clearly
could have resorted to it in the Perkins case by holding that Signal
controlled Western Hyway and thereby controlled Regal's buying
power and pricing policies. In this way the Court could have accomplished the same result in the case before it, without implying
a further extension of the Act to cover fourth-line injury. However,
since the Court did not explicitly limit the case to .its facts, and since
it further refused to apply either the "subsidiary" rationale sug21. 395 U.S. at 651. Justice Marshall suggested that, as an alternative, the Court
use the fiction of regarding the wholesaler and his retail customer as a unit for purposes of § 2(a). This approach is basically the same as the one suggested by Justice
Fortas in his concurrence in Meyer.
22. The indirect-purchaser doctrine has been utilized to broaden the scope of the
word "purchaser" under § 2(a) and that of the word "customer" under § 2{d). Cases
arising under § 2(a) have required that two factors be present. The first is that the
manufacturer must control the price which the wholesaler charges the retailer. See
Purcolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1045 (1968); Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); Dentists' Supply Co.,
37 F.T.C. 345 (1943); cf. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). For cases
in which lack of control has prevented application of the indirect-purchaser doctrine,
see Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Klein v.
Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), afjd., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956) (case
severely questions the use of the doctrine); W.F. Shraft & Sons Corp., [1963-1965
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,882 (FTC 1967). The second requirement is
that the manufacturer must have dealt directly with the retailer. This requirement has
been satisfied by direct negotiation of franchise agreements as well as by solicitation by
the manufacturer of orders to be filled by the wholesaler. Purcolator Prods., Inc., v.
FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968) (solicitation);
Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953) (franchise). The efficacy of the second
requirement has recently been called into question by the decision in Purcolator Prods.,
Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). See generally
Note, The Robinson-Patman Act-Price Discrimination-Indirect Purchaser Doctrine,
12 N.Y.L.F. 91, 104 (1966). In addition, the efficacy of the entire doctrine has been
questioned. See F. RoWE, supra note 15, at 58.
23. 390 U.S. at 354.
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gested by Justice Marsha112 -1 or the indirect-purchaser doctrine,2 5
it must be concluded that Perkins was intended to be a full extension
of the Meyer doctrine.26
There remains some confusion, however, as to the future application of the Perkins rationale. In particular, there may be some
doubt concerning the extent to which future treble-damage plaintiffs occupying the third or fourth distribution levels in cases
like Perkins must show injury to competition at those levels. In
part, this confusion stems from the language of the Court's opinion
itself. There is no mention of injury to competition at Perkins'
level. Indeed, the Court speaks only in terms of damage to the single competitor, Perkins himself. This omission of any reference
to injury to competition, and the correlative emphasis on injury
to the individual competitor, lead to the possible interpretation
that Perkins gives a cause of action for price discrimination to a
business far down the distribution chain whenever that business
can show causally related damage to itself. Under that view, the
competitor need not make a general showing of injury to competition at its level of distribution.
Such an interpretation, however, seems to be an improper reading
of the Perkins opinion. Proof of injury to competition at the plaintiff's level of distribution has always been considered an essential
element in a cause of action for price discrimination; and it is doubtful that the Court would seize upon the Perkins fact situation to
make such an abrupt departure from the accepted literal interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act.27 Moreover, it seems that injury
24. See note 21 supra.
25. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
26. Indeed, such an interpretation of Perkins seems even more appropriate when
one considers the difficulty that would ensue in attempting to establish substantial
identity under existing case law for purposes of the unit device. The standard under
the antitrust laws for establishing substantial identity between parent and subsidiary
corporations is so stringent that the parent's control over the subsidiary must render
the subsidiary a mere tool and compel the conclusion that corporate identity is a mere
fiction. See, e.g., National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1955); Baim &: Blank,
Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). These cases stand for the
notion that even though the subsidiary is wholly owned, has an interlocking board
of directors and the same operating officers, and has closely correlated operations, it is
not sufficiently interrelated with the parent to establish a substantial identity. Since
the Court in Perkins certainly realized difficulties of proving such a substantial
identity and still failed either to distinguish the case on its facts or to use a fiction
to blunt its thrust, it apparently meant Perkins to be a full extension of the protection of tl1e Robinson-Patman Act to cover fourth-line injuries.
27. As has been seen, section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964),
provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person enga~ed in commerce • • • to discriminate
in price •.• where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination or with customers of either of them
..•• [Emphasis added.]
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to competition at the fourth level could easily have been proved
in Perkins, regardless of the motives behind Standard's price discrimination. 28 To begin with, any price differential in the retail
gasoline market, however small, may seem substantial to the consumer. In addition, Perkins and other retailers operating at the
fourth level were dealing with a standardized product and probably
were operating on tight profit margins. These factors lead to the
probable conclusion that Standard's discrimination resulted in
appreciable shifts of consumer trade and formed a plausible basis
from which the Court could have inferred injury to competition
at Perkins' level.29 It appears, then, that Perkins does not give a
cause of action to the fourth-level operator unless that operator can
show that the price discrimination resulted in injury to competition
at its level.
Beyond this problem, there are some additional questions about
the long-range practical effects of the Perkins decision. First, it is
doubtful that Perkins really extends the protection of the RobinsonPatman Act in as direct or effective a manner as did the Meyer decision. In 1'•Jeyer, the Court held that when a supplier provides
promotional allowances directly to one retailer, those same promotional allowances must be offered at comparable terms to all
other retailers, even those who buy through wholesalers, and that
the supplier has the onus of guaranteeing equality of treatment
at the retail level.30 This holding means that even if the supplier
offered the allowances to all wholesalers on comparable terms, the
supplier could nevertheless be held liable for treble damages should
the wholesaler fail to pass on the allowances to retailers. 31 That
mandate directly promotes equality of treatment in the availability
of promotional allowances and arguably protects competition at
the retail level.32
28. There are at least three possible explanations for Standard's actions. One is
that Standard desired simply to increase profits without regard to present antitrust
legislation. A second and more plausible explanation is that Standard originally felt
that its discriminatory prices were cost justified, but that they could not be proved
to be so at trial. A final, but unlikely, explanation is that Standard was the victim
of the superior economic power of the "middlemen," Signal or ·western Hyway.
29. F. ROWE, supra note 15, at 181.
30. 390 U.S. at 358.
31. This interpretation follows from a literal reading of the following language
of the opinion: "We conclude that the most reasonable construction of § 2(d) is one
which places on the supplier the responsibility for making promotional allowances
available to those resellers who compete directly with the favored buyer." 390 U.S.
at 357. Since this result is so harsh, the Court may later read the quoted language as
placing only a duty of due care on the supplier. To date, however, the supplier must
still be viewed as the insurer of equality at the retail level.
32. It is arguable, however, that the Meyer mandate ensures equality while destroying competition at the retail level. For example, if it becomes too expensive
to ensure equal treatment of small neighborhood grocery stores, large suppliers of
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The Perkins decision, however, does not ensure such equality.
In Perkins, the Court did not say or even imply that the prices ultimately offered to all retailers must be equal. It held merely that
if the seller discriminates at the second level and the effect of that
discrimination is passed on down the distribution chain, then the
seller is liable for whatever damage to competition at the retail
level was caused by its discrimination at the wholesale level.83 Thus,
unless some deterrent value is garnered by exposing the supplier
to increased liability such that it will act to ensure equality of the
prices charged to retailers,84 the Court has not taken a large step
toward promoting competition. Even if the supplier sells to all
wholesalers at an equal price in an attempt to comply with Perkins, 35
the large, vertically integrated firms may continue to undercut independent operators which must deal through independent wholesalers. Of course, their ability to do so depends on the economic
circumstances of the situation, since increased size does not necessarily increase the ability to compete. But in many circumstances,
the large, integrated firms will be able to take advantage of economies of scale in order to persist in charging lower retail prices
than can independent operators, and will thereby continue to capture a large part of the retail market. Thus, it appears that unless
Perkins can be read as requiring suppliers to ensure the equality
of the prices to retailers, or unless it can be presumed that sufficient
deterrence is gained by exposing the supplier to increased liability
such that it will decide on its own to ensure competition at the
retail level, the Perkins decision fails to achieve the same sweeping
degree of protection of competition that the Meyer decision accomplished.
In addition, there is the collateral problem that suppliers like
Standard may find it difficult, if not impossible, to comply with
the holding in Perkins. The next step in the analysis, then, is to
examine a supplier's possible modes of compliance. There are two
such methods and they are based on alternative interpretations of
grocery items will concentrate on increasing their sales to the large, vertically integrated firms and will refuse to sell to the smaller retailers. Consequently, if the
neighborhood retailers are unable to buy standard brands, they may not be viable
competitors and may be forced out of business. Their failure would, in tum, reduce
competition.
!l!I. The plaintiff must, of course, prove a causal connection between the prohibited price discrimination and the injury suffered. In Perkins, the Court held
that this proposition was true regardless of the level at which the injury occurs.
The Court further noted that the standard for proving this element of the cause
of action is to present enough evidence to support an inference of causation. After
this burden is satisfied, the jury then decides whether the inference is valid, and,
if so, the amount of damages. !195 U.S. at 648.
!14. See text accompanying notes 42-50 infra.
!15. See note !17 infra and accompanying text.
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the supplier's duty under Perkins: either the supplier can comply
with the holding by charging the same price to all wholesalers, or
it can comply only by ensuring equal prices to all retailers.
Obviously, the preferable course of action from the supplier's
point of view is for it to escape liability by charging the same price
to all wholesalers. As indicated above, this mode of compliance
seems to be based on the more appropriate interpretation of Perkins, since the decision probably does not require the supplier to
ensure equality of prices at the retail level.36 Nevertheless, charging
equal prices to all wholesalers does not make sense from an economic point of view, since some wholesalers buy in considerably
greater quantities than others and the resulting lower costs to the
seller endtle the larger buyers to pay lower prices per unit. 37
The obvious response to this problem is that the supplier could
vary its prices to different wholesalers; such variation is permissible
so long as the unequal prices are cost justifiable.38 This approach
seems ideal from a theoretical point of view; but in practice it may
not represent an effective solution to the supplier's problem, since
cost justification defenses are not only expensive to establish but
very difficult to prove. 39 Indeed, as of January 1964, the FTC had
rejected twenty-three cost justification defenses, while allowing
only six to succeed.40 These statistics have led many to conclude
that the cost justification of price differentials has often remained
illusory in practice.41 Thus, a supplier may be left with no practicable course of action with respect to wholesalers. It may find it
economically infeasible to charge equal prices to all wholesalers;
but if it attempts to charge them unequal prices, it cannot depend
on the success of a cost justification defense in vindicating those
prices.
Therefore, a supplier may simply continue to charge discriminatory prices, accept the risk of some liability as a fact of commer36. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
37. Obviously, if quantity sales reduce the cost per unit, then the purchaser b en•
titled to some or all of the economic benefit of that reduced cost per unit.
38. Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964), allows for a cost justification
defense:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make
only due allowanc~ for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities
are to sud1 purchasers sold or delivered.
39. Rowe, The Federal Trade Commission's Administration of the Anti-Price
Discrimination Law-A Paradox of Antitrust Policy, 64 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 415, 424
(1964); Note, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act: The Standard
Oil Litigation, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 294, 295 (1953).
40. Rowe, supra note 39, at 424. The citations for these cases may be found in
F. ROWE, supra note 15, § IO.IO, at 63 (Supp. 1964).
41. Rowe, supra note 39, at 424.
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cial life, and adopt the expedient of attempting to reduce the amount
of liability which it could incur. In particular, the supplier may
attempt to decrease the amount of exposure to liability resulting
from suits by retailers, as opposed to those by wholesalers. 42 It is
necessary, then, to examine whether practicable methods exist for
attaining that objective.
Presumably, a reduction or elimination of potential liability
at the retail level can be accomplished only by ensuring that all
retailers pay the same price for their products, since there probably
will be no injury to retailers when they are all charged the same
price. This solution, however, is identical to that which was postulated for the second, and more tenuous, reading of the Perkins
case, that is, that suppliers can comply with the holding only by
ensuring the equality of prices to retailers. Thus, the merit qf the
Perkins decision may ultimately rest on the resolution of the problem of controlling the prices charged to retailers. If Standard and
the other major suppliers can find some way to control those prices,
they will eliminate exposure to liability and at the same time ensure
competition at the retail level. If suppliers cannot find such a solution, however, Perkins may have resulted in nothing more than
an increase in the number of privately instigated antitrust suits
without any commensurate increase in competition.
The obvious line of analysis, then, is to examine the possible
solutions open to suppliers like Standard. One superficial solution
is for the supplier to enter into resale price limitation agreements
with the wholesalers to whom it sells. This practice, however, would
obviously fall within the proscription of section I of the Sherman
Act. 43 Another possible solution is to charge the same price to all
retailers and wholesalers. This course of action would be foolish
not only from an economic point of view, 44 but also in terms of
antitrust policy, since it would eliminate most of the wholesaler's
business and thereby establish competition at the retail level by
destroying it at the wholesale level. 45 A further possibility along
42. Of course, the supplier would still be vulnerable to suits from wholesalers,
but it was liable in that area before Perkins and was able to include the costs
of such suits in its pricing structure.
43. 15 U.S.C. § I (1964). See, e.g., United States v. McKesson &: Robbins, Inc.,
351 U.S. 305 (1956). In that case, the Court held that McKesson &: Robbins, a drug
firm which served as both a manufacturer and a wholesaler, committed a per se
violation of § l of the Sherman Act when it, as a wholesaler, entered into resale price
maintenance contracts with other wholesalers.
44. This approach would be foolish in terms of economics for the same reasons
that would make it foolhardy to sell to all wholesalers at the same price. See text
accompanying note 37 supra.
•15. If wholesalers and retailers all bought at the same price, there would be
no possible profit margin left for the wholesalers, except perhaps for that on
freight charges, and consequently the wholesalers could not afford to stay in business.
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this same line is for the supplier to integrate vertically and to take
over the wholesale function entirely. Here again, however, the
supplier would possibly be guilty of violating antitrust laws. 46 One
final possibility is for the supplier to sell to its wholesalers on a consignment basis and in that way exercise more control over the ultimate price of the goods. That solution also seems doomed to
failure. Although this exact issue has never been litigated, the theory
on which the cases dealing with consignment sales to retailers have
been decided demonstrates that a consignee may be considered a
purchaser for section 2(a) purposes if the facts indicate that the
consignment relationship is being used as a covert means of price
control.47 Thus, in light of the precedent, it appears that if this type
of arrangement were ever tested by litigation, it would be held to
be illegal price fixing violative of both the Sherman Act48 and the
Robinson-Patman Act. 49 While the preceding list may not be exhaustive, it illustrates the extreme difficulty that suppliers face in
trying to find both a legal and a practical form of compliance with
the Court's decision in Perkins. 50
No doubt the independent wholesalers realized this possibility after the Meyer deci•
sion when they strongly urged the FTC not to pass its amended guides for adver·
tising because those guides would give the suppliers more control and would both
increase expenses for wholesalers and cut their profit margins. See generally Comments of the National Oil Jobbers Concerning Proposed Amended Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services (Sept. 31,
1968) (open letter to the FTC). See also Note, The FTC and Promotional Allowances:
The Fred Meyer Quagmire, 55 VA. L. R.Ev. 718 (1969).
46. In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 347 U.S. 89 (1955), the Court
held that although vertical integration per se does not violate § 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), it may become illegal if it is entered into with a specific
intent to control the market. Furthermore, if the attempt is done through the vehicle
of corporate merger, it may be circumscribed by § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1964). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294: (1962). See generally
Blackford, Vertical Acquisition and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 17 W. REs. L. R.Ev.
102 (1965). Finally, regardless of the manner in which the integration is accomplished,
the process requires a huge amount of cash. Today, due to the tightness of the money
markets, available funds are either minimal or nonexistent.
47. Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 884 (D.R.I.
1968).
48. For a discussion of Sherman Act liability, see First Natl. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ijustice
Harlan, dissenting); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
49. For a discussion of Robinson-Patman Act liability, see note 47 supra.
50. Indeed, faced with the probable failure of any attempt to comply effectively
with Perkins, the suppliers can take only defensive action. They cannot set up a
reserve to insure themselves against damages resulting from private antitrust suits,
since all of the events which fix the amount of liability and which establish the lia·
bility itself do not occur in the proper sequence. Consequently, the suppliers must
wait until the losses actually occur before they can write off both the damages and
the legal fees as tax-deductible expenses. See Commissioner v. Fifth Avenue Coach

March 1970]

Recent Developments

785

One must conclude, then, that the Court has placed suppliers
like Standard in an untenable position without a commensurate
increase in the amount of competition at the retail level. If the
supplier chooses to comply with Perkins by charging all wholesalers
the same price, it will be forced to act uneconomically and there
will not be an appreciable effect on competition at the retail level.
Furthermore, if the supplier attempts to comply by charging different prices to different wholesalers-its most probable course of
action-it runs the serious risk of being unable to prove that its
prices are cost justified. Conversely, if it decides to comply by controlling the price charged to retailers, it may destroy competition
at the wholesale level in order to establish it at the retail level;
and thus, there will be no net gain in the total amount of competition. In addition, the supplier may expose itself to liability for
violation of other antitrust laws. Therefore, regardless of the interpretation of Perkins, the effect of the case may be economic loss
to the supplier with little gain in the over-all amount of competition. Moreover, while the Perkins rationale may be a desirable
approach when a huge corporation like Standard is involved, it
would certainly yield disastrous results if applied to smaller suppliers which might be forced out of business by the resulting losses.
Accordingly, if the Perkins decision is not subsequently overturned
or at least limited to its facts, it may impede competition rather
than promote it.
Lines, Inc., 281 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1960); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a); Rev. Rul.
64-224, 1964-2 CUM. BuLL. 52; Wright, Tax Formula To Restore the Historical Effects
of the Antitrust Treble Damage Provision, 65 MICH. L. REv. 245 (1966). To make up
the difference between the amount of the total loss and the resulting tax saving, suppliers may simply raise the price of gasoline so as to pass on the costs of the Court's
edict to the consumer.

